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result of monopoly pricing based on the 
unique asset available to the ABE-its 
members who possess "highly favorable 
mortality and morbidity rates." 106 S.Ct. 
at 2429. In discussing the third factor-
that the participants could collectively 
change the nature of the program - the 
Court looked at the agreement itself which 
requires assignment of the dividend as a 
condition to participation in the program. 
The Coun rejected the argument that the 
assignment was voluntary because mem-
bers could change the policy at any time, 
stating that the Claims Court had put too 
much weight on such an unsubstantiated 
argument. Finally, the Court held that the 
ABE's program was "an example of pre-
cisely the son of unfair competition that 
Congress intended to prevent" by enacting 
the unrelated business income tax. 
If the ABE's members may deduct pan 
of their premium payments as a char-
itable contribution, the effective cost 
of ABE's insurance will be lower than 
the cost of competing policies that do 
not offer tax benefits. Similarly, if 
ABE may escape taxes on its earnings, 
it need not be as profitable as its com-
mercial counterpans in order to re-
ceive the same return on its invest-
ment. Should a commercial company 
attempt to displace ABE as the group 
policyholder, therefore, it would be at 
a decided disadvantage. 
106 S.Ct. at 2432. The only factor in the 
ABE's favor was that the insurance plan 
was consistently presented as pan of its 
fund-raising effort. However, the Court 
felt that this factor could not stand alone as 
a basis for ovenurning the assessment by 
the IRS. 
II. The Court upheld the finding of the 
Claims Court regarding the individual 
participant's claim for a charitable deduc-
tion. The fact that the respondents received 
a benefit from their contribution did not 
automatically make the premium payments 
non-deductible. Had any of the claimants 
demonstrated that the contributions were 
purposely made "in excess of the value of 
any benefit" received in return, then some 
deduction may have been allowed under 
§ 170 of the Code. However, none of the 
respondents in the action offered any proof 
that similar policies could have been pur-
chased for a lower cost. Such a lack of proof 
led the Coun to assume "that the value of 
ABE's insurance to those taxpayers at least 
equals their premium payments." 106 
S.Ct. at 2434. Thus, no charitable motiva-
tion could be found by the Coun. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens' 
main argument concerned the viability of 
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the Court's analysis regarding the ABE 
program and its effect on unfair compe-
tition. In focusing his argument on the 
Coun's failure to justify its conclusion 
with any concrete evidence, Justice Stevens 
remarked, 
The trial judge scoured the record for 
evidence pointing to a harmful effect 
on competition and found none (foot-
note omitted). The absence of evidence 
in the record, rather than the Coun's 
ruminations about possibilities and 
likelihoods, should control our analy-
sis. 106 S.Ct. at 2436. 
Justice Stevens went on to refute the Court's 
other findings regarding the panicipants 
involuntary assignment of the dividends, 
the taint of a monopoly by the ABE, and 
the lack of a factual basis behind the char-
itable panicipation of the members, con-
cluding that the decisions of the coun of 
appeals and the claims court were correct. 
The decision in United States, Petitioner 
v. American Endowment et al., represents 
yet another clarification' of the Internal 
Revenue Code; this time affecting mem-
bers of the legal community because of the 
Court's interpretation of what constitutes 
a trade or business for purposes of the un-
related business tax. 
- Barbara E. Wixon 
MacDonald v. Yolo County: THE 
SUPREME COURT REEXAMINES 
THE CONCEPT OF INVERSE 
CONDEMNATION IN 
DETERMINING WHETHER AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING 
WITHOUT COMPENSATION HAS 
OCCURRED. 
In MacDonald v. Yolo County, 54 
U.S.L.W. 4782 (U.S. June 25, 1986) (No. 
84-2015), the Supreme Coun of the United 
States in a 5-4 decision delivered by Justice 
Stevens reaffirmed Agins v. City of Ti-
buron, 447 U.S. 225 (1980), in holding 
that absent knowing the nature and extent 
of permitted development, the Coun can-
not adjudicate the constitutionality of a 
regulation that propons to limit it; in es-
sence because limiting intense develop-
ment does not prohibit all economic use of 
the land sought to be developed. 
In 1975, appellants submitted a tenta-
tive subdivision map to the Yolo County 
Planning Commission and County Board 
of Supervisors proposing to construct 
a 159-home subdivision on land which 
was in part a corn field. Both the Yolo 
County Planning Commission and the 
County Board of Supervisors, appellees, 
rejected the subdivision plan. The Board 
based their rejection on what they con-
sidered numerous factors "inconsistent 
with the General Plan of the County of 
Yolo, (and) the specific plan the County of 
Yolo embodied in zoning regulations for 
the County." MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W. at 
4782. These included: 1) the lack of access 
to and from the subdivision to a public 
street; 2) no provision for public sewer ser-
vice by any government entity; 3) inade-
quate police protection for the subdivi-
sion; and 4) no provision for water or 
maintainance of a water system by any 
governmental entity. Id. 
As a result of the Board's decision, the 
appellants claimed inverse condemnation 
and sought a declaratory judgment and 
monetary relief. 
Inverse condemnation exists when a 
governmental entity restricts land use 
through regulation, such as by prohibiting 
development, but does not condemn the 
land thereby removing the landowner's 
remedy of just compensation. Agins, 447 
U.S. at 255. The appellants accused the 
Board of "restricting the propeny to an 
open-space agricultural use by denying all 
permit applications, subdivision maps, 
and other requests to implement any other 
use, and thereby of appropriating the 'en-
tire economic use' of [ their] propeny 'for 
the sole purpose of [providing] ... a pub-
lic, open-space buffer.'" MacDonald, 54 
U.S.L.W. at 4782. Appellants concluded 
that the Board's ruling on the regulations 
denied any beneficial use of their prop-
eny, thus it was an unconstitutional taking 
without just compensation, or inverse con-
demnation.ld. at 4783. 
The California Superior Coun sustained 
appellees demurrer citing the alternative 
uses appellants could make of their land 
under the Yolo County Code §§8-2.502, 
.503. Id. Quoting Agins, the Coun con-
cluded that "irrespective of the insuffi-
ciency of the appellant's factual allegations, 
monetary damages for inverse condemna-
tion [based on land use regulations] are 
foreclosed .... " MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W. 
at 4783. 
The California Coun of Appeals affirmed 
the superior coun's application of Agins 
where monetary damages for inverse con-
demnation are not permitted in California. 
MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W. at 4783. The 
court stated that a landowner cannot re-
cover "in inverse condemnation based 
upon land use regulation." /d. In funher 
tying the facts in this action to that in 
Agins, the coun offered that the only rem-
edy available to appellants would be to set 
aside the regulations as unconstitutional. 
Nevertheless, as in Agins, the court of ap-
peals did not find an unconstitutional tak-
ing because "the refusal of the defendants 
to permit the intensive development de-
sired by the landowner does not preclude 
less intensive, but still valuable develop-
ment. Accordingly, the complaint fails to 
state a cause of action." MacDonald, 54 
U.S.L.W. at 4783. 
The Supreme Court granted the appel-
lants petition to consider the constitutional 
issue involving a regulatory taking. But, in 
a decision that essentially mirrored the 
lower courts reasoning, the Supreme Court 
did not make a final decision on the merits 
because a final determination had not been 
made by the Board of Commissioners con-
cerning the permitted use of the appellants 
property, thus making the issue not ripe 
for decision despite the prohibition on the 
housing development. Id. at 4784. 
In refusing to decide on the merits, the 
Court followed Agins in permitting local 
governments the power ofland use control 
through regulations that limit intensive 
development. The Court centered its rea-
soning behind two related components. 
First, that the appellant must establish 
that the regulation has "taken" his prop-
erty or has "gone too far." Second, that any 
proffered compensation is simply not just. 
MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W. at 4784. 
The Court, in resolving the two com-
ponents, examined the progeny of , 'taking" 
cases evolving from Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), through 
Penn Central v. New York City, 438 U.S. 
104 (1978); Agins, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), 
and San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San 
Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), to Williamson 
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 
473 U.S. __ (1985). MacDonald, 54 
U.S.L.W. at 4784. 
In Williamson, the appellant-developer 
failed to exhaust available state avenues to 
permit development or receive just com-
pensation. MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W. at 
4784. And in Agins, the Court failed to 
recognize a taking because development, 
albeit less intensive, was still permitted. In 
applying the facts in this action to their 
past examinations, Justice Stevens went 
on to conclude that as in Agins, William-
son, and San Diego Gas, the Court cannot 
decide whether the Constitution requires a 
monetary remedy to redress some regu-
latory takings because the appellant had 
left the Court uncertain as to whether a 
taking had occurred. MacDonald, 54 
U.S.L.W. at 4785. The appellant had re-
ceived the Board's determination on only 
the subdivision plan, thus leaving open 
the "final, definitive position regarding 
how [the board] will apply the regulations 
at issue to the particular land at issue." Id. 
Consequently, the appellant had not es-
tablished that their property had been 
taken and the Board's decision was upheld. 
Justice White, in his dissent, felt that 
a taking did occur when the Board de-
nied the subdivision plan. MacDonald, 54 
U.S.L.W. at 4785. He refuted the majori-
ties application of Agins, finding that the 
appellant would be unable "to develop his 
property in some economically beneficial 
manner" because further application for 
development would be futile. MacDonald, 
54 U.S.L.W. at 4786. The dissent went on 
to conclude that based on the facts, a tak-
ing had occurred and the Court should re-
mand for an explanation by the court of 
appeals as to the precise basis for its judg-
ment. Id. at 4788. 
The impact of this decision will favor 
municipalities that seek to limit growth by 
denying high density housing develop-
ments and support state regulations such 
as Maryland's recently enacted Critical 
Areas Legislation. Conversely, developers 
will certainly feel as the dissent, that any 
limit to use is a taking deserving of com-
pensation. Nevertheless, the Court seems 
to be assured of maintaining the view out-
lined in MacDonald as long as the 5-4 ma-
jority is maintained. And even with the re-
cent change in the make-up of the Court, 
which essentially effects the dissent's side, 
it seems likely that similar land use con-
trols will be sustained by the Court. 
-Michael D. Mallinoff 
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates 0, 
Tourism Co, of Puerto Rico: 
SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
REGULATIONS RESTRICTING 
ADVERTISING AIMED AT 
PUERTO RICO RESIDENTS 
In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. 
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 54 U.S.L.W. 
4956 (U.S. June 24, 1986), the Supreme 
Court continued to explore the contours of 
first amendment protection for commer-
cial speech which the court had initially 
recognized in 1976. The Court held that a 
Puerto Rico statute and regulations re-
stricting the advertising of casino gambling 
aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico, but 
not at tourists, does not facially violate 
the first amendment or the due process or 
equal protection guarantees of the Consti-
tution. 
Beginning in 1948, the Puerto Rico 
Legislature has legalized various forms of 
casino gambling, adding additional games 
since the initial Games of Chance Act of 
1948, Act No. 221 of May 15, 1948 (Act). 
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 15, § 71 (1972). How-
ever, the Act states that "[n]o gambling 
room shall be permitted to advertise or 
otherwise offer their facilities to the public 
of Puerto Rico." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 15, § 
77 (1972). Furthermore, the Economic De-
velopment Administration of Puerto Rico 
issued regulations which specified and ex-
panded the scope of the prohibition of ad-
vertising of casino gambling directed at 
the inhabitants of Puerto Rico and requir-
ing prior approval by the Tourism De-
velopment Company of any casino adver-
tising. P.R.R. & Regs. tit. 15, § 76-218 
(1972). 
In 1981, the Appellant Posadas de Puerto 
Rico Associates, doing business as Con-
dado Holiday Inn Hotel and Sands Casino, 
filed a declaratory judgment action against 
the Tourism Company in the Superior 
Court of Puerto Rico, seeking a declara-
tion that this regulatory scheme violated 
appellant's commercial speech rights un-
der the United States Constitution. The 
court upheld the facial constitutionality of 
the Act, narrowly construing it as "the 
only advertisement prohibited by law orig-
inally is that which is contracted with an 
advertising agency, for consideration, to 
attract the resident to·bet at the dice, card, 
roulette and bingo tables." 54 U .S.L. W. at 
4958. The appellant's appeal was dismissed 
by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico as "it 
[did] not present a substantial constitu-
tional question." Id. at 4959. However, the 
United States Supreme Court granted the 
petition for writ of certiorari filed by Po-
sadas de Puerto Rico Associates. 
The Supreme Court, in a five to four de-
cision, upheld the decision and narrowing 
construction issued by the lower court. 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the major-
ity, found two reasons for the Court's hold-
ing. First, he determined that by applying 
the first amendment analysis concerning 
commercial speech restrictions as dictated 
by Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. 
v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 
(1980), the Puerto Rico regulatory scheme 
passed constitutional muster. Second, the 
Court, creating a new form of first amend-
ment analysis parturient of greater enroads 
on the protection of speech, held that "the 
greater power to completely ban casino 
gambling necessarily includes the lesser 
power to ban advertising of casino gam-
bling." 54 U.S.L.W. at 4961. 
The Court reiterated that a limited form 
of first amendment protection for com-
mercial speech was first recognized in Vir-
ginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Counci~ Inc., 425 U.S. 
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